Abstract-We address the problem of state estimation, attack isolation, and control for discrete-time Linear Time Invariant (LTI) systems under (potentially unbounded) actuator false data injection attacks. Using a bank of Unknown Input Observers (UIOs), each observer leading to an exponentially stable estimation error in the attack-free case, we propose an estimator that provides exponential estimates of the system state and the attack signals when a sufficiently small number of actuators are attacked. We use these estimates to control the system and isolate actuator attacks. Simulations results are presented to illustrate the performance of the results.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networked Control Systems (NCSs) have received considerable attention in recent years as it has flexible architectures offer, such as reduced weight, volume and installation costs, and better maintainability when compared with traditional control systems where sensors and actuators communicate through point-to-point (wired) links. With the exponential growth of NCSs, new security challenges have become a very important issue as wireless communication networks might serve as new access points for adversaries trying to disrupt the system dynamics. Cyber-physical attacks on control systems have caused substantial damage to a number of physical processes. Recent incidents has shown that strategic mechanisms to identify and deal with attacks on NCSs are strongly needed.
In [1] - [23] , a range of topics related to security of control systems have been discussed. In general, they provide analysis tools for quantifying the performance degradation induced by different classes of attacks; and propose reaction and prevention strategies to identify and counter their effect on the system dynamics. For instance, in [1] , compressed sensing is used for state estimation for discrete-time Linear Time Invariant (LTI) systems under sensor attacks. In [22] , exploiting sensor redundancy, the problem of state estimation for continuous-time LTI systems is considered. The authors propose a multi-observer estimator, using a bank of Luenberger observers, which provides a robust estimate of the system state in spite of sensor attacks.
Fault diagnosis is a well-established topic in the research field of control [24] - [26] . However, the classical faulttolerant filters that can detect faults on actuators may not be adequate when considering actuator attacks. For example, in [25] , Unknown Input Observers (UIOs) are used for detection and isolation of faulty actuators for continuoustime linear systems under the assumption that the number of failed actuators is known. Unlike faults, attacks come from attackers with malicious intent, thus, this priori knowledge is often unavailable in security framework. This motivates our work.
In this manuscript, we use Unknown Input Observers (UIOs) to address the problem of state estimation, attack isolation, and control for discrete-time LTI systems under (potentially unbounded) actuator attacks. Unknown input observers are dynamical systems capable of estimating the state of the plant without using input signals. If such an observer exists and some of the inputs are subject to attacks, we can reconstruct the system state without using inputs; and use these estimates to reconstruct the attack signals by using model matching techniques. The existence of UIOs depend on the system dynamics, i.e., the matrices (A, B, C) comprising the system. If a UIO does not exist for this complete (A, B, C) but it does for some partial (A,B i , C), whereB i denotes a submatrix of B with fewer columns and the same number of rows, then, using a bank of observers, we can use similar ideas to perform state estimation and attack isolation at the price of only being able to isolate when a sufficiently small subset of actuators are under attack. The main idea behind our multi-observer estimator is the following. Each UIO in the bank is constructed using a triple (A,B i , C), i.e., the i-th observer does not use the input signals associated withB i , but it does use the remaining input signals. If the inputs corresponding toB i include all the attacked ones, this UIO produces an exponentially stable estimation error. For every pair of UIOs in the bank, we compute the largest difference between their estimates. Then, we select the pair leading to the smallest difference and prove that these observers reconstruct the state of the system exponentially. This idea is guaranteed to work under the assumption that less than half of the actuators are attacked. This multi-observer approach is inspired by the results given in [27] where the problem of state estimation for continuous-time LTI systems under sensor attacks is considered. Once we have an estimate of the state, we reconstruct the attack signals using model matching techniques. Finally, we propose a simple yet effective technique to stabilize the system by switching off the isolated actuators, and closing the loop with a multiobserver based output dynamic feedback controller. Here, we assume that the set of attacked actuators is time-invariant, i.e., if the opponent compromises a set of actuators at some time-instant, only this set will be compromised in forward time. Because attack signals may be zero for some time instants, the actuators isolated as attack-free might arbitrarily switch among all the supersets of the set of attack-free actuators. Therefore, we need a controller able to stabilize the closed-loop dynamics under the arbitrary switching induced by turning off the isolated actuators. To achieve this, we assume that a state feedback controller that stabilizes the switching closed-loop system exists, and use this controller together with the multi-observer estimator to stabilize the system. We use Input-to-State Stability (ISS) [28] of the closed-loop system with respect to the exponentially stable estimation error to conclude on stability of the closed-loop dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present some preliminary results needed for the subsequent sections. In Section III, we introduce the proposed UIObased estimation schemes. In Section IV, a method for isolating actuator attacks is described. The proposed control scheme is given in Section V. Finally, in Section VI, we give concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
We denote the set of real numbers by R, the set of natural numbers by N , the set of integers by Z, and the set of n×m real matrices by R n×m , m, n ∈ N. For any vector v ∈ R n , we denote v J the stacking of all v i , i ∈ J, J ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, |v| = √ v v, and supp(v) = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} |v i = 0}. We denote the cardinality of a set S as card(S). The binomial coefficient is denoted as a b , where a, b are nonnegative integers. We denote a variable m uniformly distributed in the interval (z 1 , z 2 ) as m ∼ U(z 1 , z 2 ) and normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ 2 as m ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ). The notation 0 n and I n denote the zero matrix and the identity matrix of dimension R n×n , respectively. We simply write 0 and I when their dimensions are evident.
III. UNKNOWN INPUT OBSERVER-BASED ESTIMATOR
Consider the discrete-time LTI system:
with state x ∈ R n , output y ∈ R ny , known input u ∈ R p , and vector of actuator attacks a ∈ R p , a = (a 1 , . . . , a p ) T . That is, a i (k) = 0 for all k ≥ 0 if the i-th actuator is attack-free; otherwise, a i (k) = 0 for some (but not necessarily all) time instants k ≥ 0, and can be arbitrarily large. Matrices A, B, C are of appropriate dimensions, (A, B) is stabilizable, (A, C) is detectable, and B has full column rank. Let the set of unknown attacked actuators be denoted by W ⊂ {1, . . . , p}, i.e., a i (k i ) = 0 for some k i ≥ 0 and all i ∈ W .
Assumption 1
The set of attacked actuators is time invariant, i.e., W ⊂ {1, . . . , p} is a constant set.
A. Complete Unknown Input Observers
We first treat (u + a) as an unknown input to system (1) and consider a UIO with the following structure:
where z ∈ R n is the state of the observer,x ∈ R n denotes the estimate of the system state, and (N, L, E) are observer matrices of appropriate dimensions to be designed. It is easy to verify that if (N, L, E) satisfy the following equations:
then, the estimation error e :=x − x satisfies the difference equation: (2) is a UIO for (1). In [29] , it is proved that such an observer exists if and only if the following two conditions are satisfied:
Assume that conditions (c 1 ) and (c 2 ) are satisfied; then, observer (2) can be constructed by solving (3) for a Schur matrix N . Hence, for such an observer, there exist c > 0 and λ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying:
for k ≥ 0, i.e., observer (2) reconstructs the system state without using any input for arbitrarily large attack signals a.
Example 1: Consider the following system:
An UIO exists for system (6) . We let W = {1}, a ∈ U(−1, 1), u ∈ U(−1, 1), and the initial conditions (x 1 (0), x 2 (0)) ∈ N (0, 1 2 ). We solve (3) for some Schur matrix N and construct an unknown input observer for (6) . The performance of the estimator is shown in Figure 1 for
B. Partial Unknown Input Observers
In [27] , the problem of state estimation for continuoustime LTI system under sensor attacks is solved using a bank of Luenberger observers. Inspired by these results, we use a bank of partial UIOs to estimate the state of the system when actuator attacks occur. Here, we are implicitly assuming that either condition (c 1 ) or (c 2 ) (or both) cannot be satisfied by the triple (A, B, C). Let B be partitioned as
n×1 is the i-th column of B. Then, the attacked system (1) can be written as
where the attack input a W can be regarded as an unknown input and the columns of b W are b i for i ∈ W . Denote by b J the matrix whose columns are b i for i ∈ J. Let q be the largest integer such that for all J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) ≤ 2q < p, the following is satisfied:
with detectable pair (C, A − E J CA), and Schur N J . Then, if conditions (c 3 ) and (c 4 ) are satisfied, a UIO with the following structure: z
exists for each b J , J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) ≤ 2q < p, where z J ∈ R n is the observer state,x J ∈ R n denotes the state estimate, and (N J , L J , T J , E J ) are the observer matrices satisfying (8), see [29] for further details. That is, system (9) is a UIO for the system:
with unknown input b J a J and known input Bu. It follows that the estimation error e J =x J − x satisfies the difference equation: e
with N J schur. Note that if conditions (c 3 ) and (c 4 ) are satisfied for b J with card(J) = 2q = p, then conditions (c 1 ) and (c 2 ) are satisfied and (9) is a complete UIO for system (1) with T J = 0. Therefore, considering partial UIOs, we assume 2q < p to exclude this case.
Assumption 2 There are at most q attacked actuators, i.e.,
where q > 0 is the largest integer satisfying (c 3 ) and (c 4 ).
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, among all possible sets of q actuators, at least one set includes all the attacked actuators.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 2, for each set of q actuators, among all its supersets of 2q actuators, at least one superset includes all the attacked actuators.
Proof: Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 follow trivially from the fact that 0 < q < p/2. Note that the existence of a UIO for each b J with card(J) ≤ 2q implies that if W ⊆ J, the estimation error e J :=x J − x satisfies
for some c J > 0, λ J ∈ (0, 1), all e J (0) ∈ R n and all k ≥ 0. Let Assumption 2 be satisfied. We construct a UIO for each J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = q and each set S with card(S) = 2q. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists at least one setJ ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = q such that W ⊆J and the estimate produced by the UIO forJ is a correct state estimate. Thus, the estimates given by any S ⊃J with card(S) = 2q will be consistent with that given byJ. This motivates the following estimation strategy: For each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) = q and all k ≥ 0, we define π J (k) as the largest deviation betweenx J (k) and x S (k) that is given by any set S ⊃ J with card(S) = 2q:
for all k ≥ 0, and define the sequence σ(k) as σ(k) := arg min J⊂{1,...,p}:card(J)=q
The estimate given by the set σ(k) is a correct estimate, i.e.,
wherex σ(k) (k) denotes the estimate given by the set σ(k), provides an exponential estimate of the system state. For simplicity and without generality, for all J and S, z J (0) and z S (0) are chosen such thatx J (0) =x S (0) =x(0). The following result summarizes the ideas presented above.
Theorem 1 Consider system (1). Let conditions (c 3 )
and (c 4 ), and Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 be satisfied, and consider the multi-observer (14)- (16) . Define the estimation error e(k) :=x σ(k) (k) − x(k); then, there exist constants c > 0 andλ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying:
for all e(0) ∈ R n , k ≥ 0.
Proof: By Lemma 1, there exists at least one setJ with card(J) = q such thatJ ⊃ W . By (c 3 ) and (c 4 ), for J = J ⊃ W with card(J) = q, there exist cJ > 0 and λJ ∈ (0, 1), such that
for all e(0) ∈ R n and k ≥ 0. Moreover, for any set S ⊃J with card(S) = 2q, we have S ⊃ W ∀k ≥ 0; hence, by (c 3 ) and (c 4 ), there exist c S > 0 and λ S ∈ (0, 1) such that
for all e(0) ∈ R n and k ≥ 0. Consider πJ in (14) . Combining the above results, we have that
for all k ≥ 0. From (18) and (19), we obtain
for all e(0) ∈ R n and k ≥ 0, where
Note that S ⊃J with card(S) = 2q, thus, from (15), we have π σ(k) (k) ≤ πJ (k). From Lemma 2, we know that there exists at least one setS ⊃ σ(k) with card(S) = 2q such that S ⊃ W ∀k ≥ 0, and, by (c 3 ) and (c 4 ), there exist cS > 0 and λS ∈ (0, 1) such that
for all e(0) ∈ R n and k ≥ 0. From (14), by construction
|, using the above lower bound on π σ(k) (k) and the triangle inequality, we have that
for all k ≥ 0. Hence, from (21) and (22), we have
for all e(0) ∈ R n and k ≥ 0, wherec = 3 max cS, c J and λ = max λS, λ J . Inequality (24) is of the form (17) , and the result follows. Example 2 Consider the following system:
It can be verified that a complete UIO for (25) does not exist. However, partial UIOs exist for each b J with card(J) ≤ 2; then, 2q = 2, i.e., q = 1. We let W = {1}, i.e., the first actuator is attacked. We let (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) ∈ U(−1, 1), a 1 ∈ U(−10, 10), and (x 1 (0), x 2 (0), x 3 (0)) ∈ N (0, 1 2 ). We construct an UIO for each set J ⊂ {1, 2, 3} with card(J) = 1 and each S ⊂ {1, 2, 3} with card(S) = 2. Totally 
IV. ISOLATION OF ACTUATOR ATTACKS
Once we have an estimatex(k) of x(k), either using the complete observer in Section III-A or the partial multiobserver estimator in Section III-B, we can use these es- timates, the system model (1), and the known inputs to exponentially reconstruct the attack signals. First, consider the complete observer in Section III-A. By construction, the estimation error e =x − x satisfies the difference equation (4) for some Schur matrix N . Note that e =x − x ⇒ x = x − e ⇒ x + =x + − e + . Then, the system dynamics (1) can be written in terms of e andx as follows:
because B has full column rank, where B −1 lef t denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse of B. Therefore, because e (and thus e + as well) vanishes exponentially, the following attack estimate:
exponentially reconstructs the attack signals a(k − 1), i.e., lim
Then, for sufficiently large k, we assume supp(a(k)) = supp(a(k − 1)), thus, the sparsity pattern ofâ(k) can be used to isolate actuator attacks at time k, i.e.,
whereŴ (k) denotes the set of isolated actuators at time k. Note that we can only estimate a fromx + and e + , which implies that we always have, at least, one-step delay.
Next, consider the partial multi-observer estimator given in Section III-B. In this case, the attack vector a can also be written as (26) but the estimation error dynamics is now given by some nonlinear difference equation characterized by the estimator structure in (14)- (16) . Let the estimation error dynamics be given by
for some nonlinear function f :
That is, the estimation error is given by some nonlinear function of the state and the attack signals. However, in Theorem 1, we have proved that e converges to the origin exponentially. Hence, the terms depending on e and e + in the expression for a in (26) vanishes exponentially and therefore the attack estimate in (27) exponentially reconstructs the attack signals. Again, the sparsity pattern ofâ(k) can be used to isolate actuator attacks using (29) . Example 3 Consider system (25) and the multi-observer estimator in Example 2. Let q
2 ). We obtainx(k) using (14)- (16) and the vector a(k) from (27) . The performance is shown in Figure 3 . Note thatŴ (k) = {1}, i.e., the first actuator is correctly isolated.
V. CONTROL
In this section, we propose a simple yet effective technique to stabilize the system by switching off the isolated actuators, i.e., by removing the columns of B which correspond to the isolated actuators, and closing the loop with a multi-observer (observer) based output dynamic feedback controller. Indeed, we need the system to be stabilizable after switching off the isolated actuators. We first consider the case when a complete UIO exists (Section III-A), i.e.,x is generated by (2) . We estimateâ(k) using (27) and obtainŴ (k) from (29) . Again, let B be partitioned as
DefineJ(k) := {1, . . . , p} \Ŵ (k) and bJ (k) as the matrix whose columns are b i for i ∈J(k), i.e.,J(k) ⊂ {1, . . . , p} is the set of isolated attack-free actuators and the columns of bJ (k) are the corresponding columns of B. Therefore, after switching off the setŴ (k) of actuators, the system has the following form:
whereū ∈ R card(J(k)) is the set of isolated attack-free inputs. Let q be the largest integer such that (A, b J ) is stabilizable for each set J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} with card(J) ≥ p − q where b J denotes a matrix whose columns are b i for i ∈ J. We assume that at most q actuators are attacked. It follows that p − q ≤ card(J(k)) ≤ p. We assume the following.
Assumption 3
For any subset J with cardinality card(J) = p − q , there exists a linear switching state feedback controllerū = KJ (k) x such that the closed-loop dynamics:
) is GAS for bJ (k) arbitrarily switching among all b J with J ⊂ J ⊂ {1, . . . , p} and p − q ≤ card(J ) ≤ p.
Remark 1
We do not give a method for designing the linear switching state feedback controllerū = KJ (k) x. We refer the interested reader to, e.g., [30] and references their, for design methods of linear switching controllers.
By switching off the setŴ (k) of actuators at time k, using the controller designed for the setJ(k), and lettingū = KJ (k)x , the closed-loop system can be written as
with estimation error e =x − x satisfying the difference equation (4) for some Schur matrix N . Because e(k) converges to zero exponentially, e(k) in (33) is a vanishing perturbation. Hence, under Assumption 3, it follows that lim k→∞ x(k) = 0.
Next, assume that a complete UIO does not exist but partial UIOs exist for each b J with card(J) ≤ 2q < p (Section III-B) and q ≤ q . We assume that at most q actuators are attacked. We constructx(k) from (14)- (16), estimateâ(k) using (27) , and obtainŴ (k) from (29) . After switching off the setŴ (k) of actuators, the system has the form (31) with p − q ≤ card(J(k)) ≤ p. We assume the following.
Assumption 4
For any subset J with cardinality card(J) = p−q, there exists a linear switching state feedback controller u = KJ (k) x such that the closed-loop dynamics:
Then, by switching off the setŴ (k) of actuators at time k, using the controller designed for the setJ(k), and lettingū = KJ (k)x , the closed-loop dynamics can be written in the form (33). Then, in this case, e(k) is generated by some nonlinear difference equation of the form (30) . Under Assumption 4, the closed-loop dynamics (33) is Input-to-State Stable (ISS) with input e(k) and some linear gain, see [31] . Moreover, in Theorem 1, we have proved that e(k) converges to the origin exponentially uniformly in x(k) and a(k). The latter and ISS of the system dynamics imply that lim k→∞ x(k) = 0 [31] . 
with u = KJ (k)x . Since (A, b i ) is stabilizable for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we have q = 2. It can be verified that there does not exist a complete UIO for this system but partial UIOs exist for each b J with card(J) ≤ 2, then we have q = 1. We let W = {1}, and a 1 ∈ U(−1, 1). We UIOs and use the design method given in [30] to build controllers for actuators {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, {1, 2, 3}. Then, we use the multi-observer approach in Section III-B to estimate the state, reconstruct the attack signals, and control the system. The state of the system is shown in Figure 4 .
VI. CONCLUSION
We have addressed the problem of state estimation, attack isolation, and control for discrete-time LTI systems under (potentially unbounded) actuator false data injection attacks. Using a bank of Unknown Input Observers (UIOs), we have proposed an estimator that reconstructs the system state and the attack signals. We have proved that the designed estimator provides exponentially stable estimation errors for potentially unbounded attack signals. We used these estimates to control the system and isolate actuator attacks. We have provided simulations results to illustrate the performance of the results.
